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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT To TRAVEL-AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF 
STATE To DENY P ASSPORTs-Petitioner's application for a passport was 
denied under §51.135 of the Passport Regulations1 promulgated by the 
Secretary of State on the grounds that he was a Communist and that he had 
a record of consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party 
line.2 The letter of denial stated that before a passport would be issued, a 
non-communist affidavit as provided for in the Regulations3 would be re-
quired. Following petitioner's refusal to file the affidavit the State Depart-
ment informed him that until one was filed his application would receive 
no further consideration. Petitioner thereupon brought an action for 
declaratory relief in the district court, but the court granted summary 
judgment for respondent. The court of appeals affirmed.4 On certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, four justices dissenting.5 
122 C.F.R. §§51.1 to 51.170 (1958). 
2 22 C.F.R. §51.135 (1958) provides that passports shall not issue to those who are 
Communists, are under control of the Communist movement, or are going abroad to 
advance the Communist movement. 22 C.F.R. §51.141 (1958) provides that consistent and 
prolonged adherence to the Party line prima facie supports a finding that the applicant 
is under control of the Party. 
3 22 C.F.R. §51.142 (1958). 
4 Kent v. Dulles, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 600. Briehl v. Dulles, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 
248 F. (2d) 561, was a case in which Dr. Walter Briehl brought an action similar to peti-
tioner's, with the same result. The cases were consolidated on certiorari to the Supreme 
Court, 355 U.S. 881 (1957). 
5 Justice Clark was joined in his dissent by Justices Burton, Harlan and Whittaker. 
120 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [Vol. 57 
The right to travel is a "liberty" protected by the Constitution and Congress 
has not authorized its curtailment by the Secretary of State on the grounds 
set forth in §5LI35 of the Regulations.6 Therefore, respondent could not 
require a non-communist affidavit from petitioner. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116 (1958). 
Traditionally there has been some recognition of a right to international 
travel,7 but nowhere in the Constitution is that right given specific protec-
tion. It has long been held, however, that a right to travel among the 
states exists as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.8 In a con-
curring opinion in Edwards v. California,9 Justice Douglas indicated that 
such a right to travel was even more basic than a necessary incidence of our 
form of government, the traditional test applied in finding such a privilege 
or immunity.10 And now, relying in part on a historical basis,11 and in part 
on dictum appearing in Williams v. Fears,12 the Court has established that 
a right to international travel does exist as a personal "liberty" protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.13 A problem remains as to the proper test to use 
in determining the extent to which the right to travel may be limited. The 
right to travel could be treated as a facet of free expression and communica-
tion under the First Amendment, the threat of passport denial for political 
reasons being treated as a prior restraint on free speech.14 Such an analysis, 
while more difficult to reach than the Fifth Amendment approach actually 
adopted, would make possible use of the "clear and present danger" rule 
as an overriding limitation. Under the analysis chosen there are no estab-
lished guideposts since the Fifth Amendment merely requires that due 
6 In a case decided the same day, and for the reasons given in the principal case, 
the Court held that Weldon Bruce Dayton, who had signed the required affidavit, could 
not be denied a passport on the basis of §51.135. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). 
7 41 GEo. L. J. 63 (1952). See generally Boudin, "The Constitutional Right to Travel," 
56 CoL. L. REV. 47 (1956); Chafee, "Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787" 
(University of Kansas Press, 1956). 
s Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 at 181 (1941), concurring opinion of Justice Jackson. 
See also United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). See generally Vestal, "Freedom of 
Movement," 41 IowA L. REv. 6 (1955). 
9 314 U.S. 160 at 177 (1941); but see United States v. Wheeler, note 8 supra. 
10 E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, note 8 supra. 
11 Principal case at 125, 126. 
12 179 U.S. 270 at 274 (1900). "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to 
remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal 
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any 
State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the 
Constitution." 
13 Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Several lower courts had previously 
used the analysis of the right to travel adopted by the Court. E.g., Bauer v. Acheson, 
(D.C. D.C. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 445; Shachtman v. Dulles, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 938, 
noted 41 CoRN. L. Q. 282 (1956). 
14 See Wyzanski, "Freedom to Travel," ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1952, p. 66; and see 
23 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 260 (1956). 
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process be accorded.15 This problem will undoubtedly cause the Court 
some vexation in the future. 
At present, obtaining a passport is a prerequisite to leaving and enter-
ing this country.16 Therefore, since a right to travel exists, there must also 
exist a right to obtain a passport when a passport is required. The issue as 
framed by the Court in the principal case was whether Congress authorized 
the Secretary of State, in the exercise of his apparently broad discretion in 
issuing passports,17 to deny this right on security grounds. Whenever possi-
ble, the Court will construe a statute to avoid the constitutional question.18 
Where the statute appears to violate personal rights it is construed narrow-
ly,19 and a power that impinges on personal rights is upheld only re-
luctantly.20 However, weight should be given to any long continued inter-
pretation by the agency charged with administering the given statute,21 
particularly when construction of a subsequent re-enactment is involved. 
The majority found that until 1926, when the original statute granting the 
Secretary of State broad discretion to deny passports22 was re-enacted,23 the 
Secretary's discretion to deny passports had been exercised in but two gen-
eral areas,24 and it therefore held that in 1926, and again in 1952 when pass-
ports were made requisite, Congress intended to limit his discretion to those 
areas. It further said that security denials during wartime should not be 
considered in determining congressional intent in times of peace. Although 
prior to 1948 passport denials for security reasons were not as frequent as 
denials on other grounds, such denials were made.25 Furthermore, in enact-
15 See 23 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 260 (1956). 
16 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1185; 67 Stat. C31 (1953), Proc. No. 3004. The 
statute states in part that it shall be "unlawful for any citizen of the United States to 
depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he 
bears a valid passport." 
17 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. (1952) §2lla. "The Secretary of State may grant and 
issue passports . • . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for 
and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify 
such passports.~ 
18 United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). 
19 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). In this way there is a better chance of uphold-
ing the statute and, at the same time, protecting personal rights. 
20 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). 
21 United States v. Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337 (1908). See also Allen v. 
Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 
U.S. 306 (1957). 
22 11 Stat. 60 (1856). 
23 44 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. (1952) §2lla, note 17 supra. 
24 These were denials for (I) lack of allegience, and (2) illegal conduct. See 3 HACK-
WORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw §268 (1942); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d rev. ed., §401 
(1945); 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw §514 (1906). 
25 Refusal of passports to Communists, State Department memorandum, May 29, 
1956, pp. I, 2, quoted in Report of the Commission on Government Security, S. Doc. No. 
64 of the 85th Cong., 471 (1957); Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, circular, May 6, 1861, MS. 
Circulars, 1.179, quoted in 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d rev. ed., 920 (1906); M.S. 
Dept. of State, file 130H7223 (1921), quoted in 3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 493 
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ing the wartime and emergency statutes that required passports,26 Congress 
clearly intended that the Secretary, by denial of passports, should act as a 
security agency during periods of wartime and national emergency.27 There-
fore, regardless of congressional intent in 1926, it would appear that when 
passports were made requisite by the 1952 statute28 Congress intended that 
the Secretary should exercise his discretion in the security area during any 
period where that statute was invoked. On this basis, since we have been in 
a declared state of emergency since 1941,29 the Court might better have 
found that Congress did intend the Secretary to deny passports for security 
reasons. As a result of the grounds upon which the Court based its decision, 
we are still left with serious questions of how far and for what reasons the 
right to travel may be limited, and to what extent procedural due process 
in passport cases will be required.80 By avoiding these questions, the Court 
has failed to solve our basic passport problem-the conflict between national 
security and the personal right to travel. 
Arnold Henson, S.Ed. 
(1942); Sec. of State Instruction of April 27, 1907 to Minister in Buenos Aires, quoted in 
3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 500 (1942); Under Secretary of State, Memorandum 
Re Applicanis for Passports Who Are Bolshevists or Who Are Connected with Bolshevist 
Government, Code 5000 (1920), quoted in principal case at 135, dissentin~ opinion. 
26 3 Stat. 199 (1815); 40 Stat. 559 (1918); 55 Stat. 252 (1941); 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 
u.s.c. (1952) §1185. 
27 See to this effect 56 CONG. R.Ec. 6029, 6030, 6065, 6192 (1918); 87 CoNG. REC. 5048-
5053, 5386-5388 (1941); 96 CoNG. REc. 15631 (1950); S. Rep. 444, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1 
(1941); S. Rep. 2369, Part 2, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 10 (1950); H. Rep. 485, 65th Cong., 2d 
sess., p. 2 (1918). 
28 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1185. 
29 55 Stat. 1696 (1941), Proc. No. 2523; 64 Stat. A 454 (1950), Proc. No. 2914; 66 Stat. 
C31 (1952), Proc. No. 2974; 67 Stat. C31 (1953), Proc. No. 3004. 
so See also Dayton v. Dulles, note 6 supra. 
